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ABSTRACT 
Unsolicited ratings have long been overlooked in the investment 
landscape and issuer pay models.  Although Congress has lost its 
confidence in the credit rating agencies’ reputation theory and is now 
considering a semi-closed market as the only viable solution to the 
conflict of interest problem, financial scholars have proposed the 
Inequality model using unsolicited ratings and focusing on a 
reputational theory that could lead to more stringent rating standards.  
This Note argues that it is possible to achieve the Inequality for 
unsolicited ratings by utilizing the already required disclosures and 
making a few enhancements.  This Note proposes that this will in 
turn improve accuracy and combat the conflict of interest problem 
without deviating from free market principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Four years after the 2008 financial crisis, the United States 
economy is still recovering and fingers are being pointed at the credit 
rating agencies (“CRAs”) and the issuer pay model for their role in the 
economic collapse.1  Many question how CRAs can honestly evaluate 
entities that are paying their bills.2  Congress and many academics have 
rejected the long propounded reputation theory, which holds that the 
mere threat of a loss of reputation curtails CRAs bad behavior, and 
justifies little to no regulation within the industry.3  Yet, reversing the 
current approach to an investor-pay model is also inadequate for the task 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxv (2011), 
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_ 
full.pdf. 
 2. See Louise Story et al., Anger Over Credit Rating Resurfaces in Washington, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, at A15,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/ 
business/economy/standard-poors-downgrade-evokes-anger-in-washington.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
 3. See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank 
Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1305–06 (2011); Timothy E. Lynch, 
Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory 
Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 250–67 (2009); Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006). 
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of evaluating the credit risk in the modern economy.4  Congress and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have attempted to fix 
issuer pay problems through the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 (“CRARA” or “Credit Reform Act”)5 and Title IX of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) 6  by bringing CRAs within the SEC’s regulatory purview, 
requiring extensive disclosures, and changing the hiring process for 
ratings to an assignment system.7 
Even prior to the investor-pay or issuer pay models, the very first 
publication by Moody’s Investors Services (“Moody’s”) was a book of 
unsolicited ratings prepared by Moody’s without compensation from 
issuers, providing information on issuers for the marketplace.8   The 
practice of issuing unsolicited ratings has persisted under both models,9 
but in the last fifteen years, unsolicited ratings have lost their popularity 
and were not mentioned or used in either the CRARA or Dodd-Frank.  
Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (“Fulghieri”) proposed a rational expectation 
model  to identify the circumstances in which unsolicited ratings would 
lead to more stringent or less stringent ratings standards.10  In forming 
this rational expectation model, Fulghieri and his colleagues considered 
both the positive and negative incentives of CRAs, focusing on 
reputational theory, and concluded that if the long-term reputational 
costs of inaccurate rating are higher than the short-term gains (the 
“Inequality” 11 ), CRAs will issue accurate ratings, including for 
unsolicited ratings.12 
This Note will argue that within the context of unsolicited ratings, 
the rejected reputational theory will produce accurate and beneficial 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, FED. RES. BANK 
N.Y. Q. REV., Summer-Fall 1994, at 4, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
research/quarterly_review/1994v19/v19n2article1.pdf (discussing the rapid growth in 
size and subject matter for CRAs after the switch to the issuer pay model which could 
not have been possible under the investor pay model). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955 (2010). 
 7. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the Dodd-Frank reforms. 
 8. Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4. 
 9. Id. at 5. 
 10. Paolo Fulghieri, Gunter Strobl & Han Xia, The Economics of Solicited and 
Unsolicited Credit Ratings (Am. Fin. Ass’n 2011 Denver Meetings, Working Paper, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572059 
(producing a mathematical model rather than empirical testing). 
 11. Long term reputation cost > short term gains. 
 12. See id. at 26. 
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ratings if the Inequality is achieved.  This Note will employ the 
principles expressed by the Inequality to examine the source of the 
problems that have plagued the credit rating industry and those who rely 
on it throughout the last decade.13  In addition, this Note will identify 
ways that unsolicited ratings will help alleviate these issues, and 
evaluate the extent to which new proposed reforms, including Dodd-
Frank, succeed in minimizing the harmful effects of the short-term gains 
CRAs derive from unsolicited ratings while maximizing the positive 
influence of the long-term reputational costs CRAs suffer as a result of 
inaccuracies in ratings.   
Part I discusses the history of CRAs and the reputational difficulties 
that plagued CRAs as a consequence of the Enron bankruptcy and the 
2008 financial crisis.  Part II considers how CRARA and Dodd-Frank 
tried to solve these problems and explores unsolicited ratings in the 
context of the Inequality.  Part III identifies the conditions necessary to 
make the Inequality hold true in the market for corporate bonds, the 
impact of Dodd-Frank, and the next steps that must be taken. 
I. RATING AGENCIES: HISTORY AND THE CRISES 
CRAs, a product of the industrial age, were developed to provide 
investors with much needed information for making investing more 
manageable in a rapidly growing technological world.14  These agencies 
took complex data and combined it to produce a single neat symbol.15  
                                                                                                                                         
 13. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the Enron bankruptcy and the 2008 
Financial Crisis. 
 14. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 15. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 638–39 (1999).  A CRA, 
after analyzing all the available data on a certain bond, instrument, or organization, will 
provide its opinion on the likelihood that the issuer will default on its obligations. See 
id. at 641.  CRA’s opinion is reflected on both ordinal (A,B,C) and cardinal (AAA, AA, 
A) scales. Id. at 642.  However, there are two general categories: “investment grade” 
(i.e. AAA–BBB) and speculative or not investment grade (BB–D). SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N., REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 702(B) OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 25 (2003) [hereinafter SEC CRA REPORT], available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf.  A triple “A” rating, 
whether a Moody’s AAA or an S&P Aaa, implies an “extremely strong capacity” to 
satisfy the debt commitment. See STANDARD & POOR’S FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.L.C., 
STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS DEFINITIONS (June 22, 2012), available at 
2013] UNSOLICITED RATINGS & CRAs 455 
In 1909, John Moody, inspired by mercantile rating agencies, took the 
next step and provided security ratings for railroad bonds in a single 
book.16  Moody’s was soon joined by Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) in 
1916 and Fitch Publishing Company in 1924. 17   Moody’s initial 
publication contained only unsolicited ratings, and in the first half of the 
twentieth century, all CRAs operated on a pure investor paid 
subscription model.18 
It was not until 1970, when Penn Central defaulted on $82 million 
in commercial paper, that CRAs began to transition to the issuer paid 
model.19  This shift allowed CRAs to eliminate the free rider effect that 
discouraged new investor subscriptions,20 raise funds that would allow 
for greater information gathering, 21  and gain access to non-public 
company information from obligor participation.22  Today, CRAs charge 
based on the size and complexity of the rated security, although it is 
typically two to three basis points of a bond’s face amount at issuance.23  
The switch in the financial models allowed S&P and Moody’s to expand 
internationally and grow exponentially in size, as well as increase the 
number and types of rated securities.24 
Over the years, CRAs have become an integral part of the financial 
system, having been incorporated into the regulation of the markets and 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/general/RatingsDirect_Commentary_979212_06
_22_2012_12_42_54.pdf; MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., RATING SYMBOLS & 
DEFINITIONS 5–7 (June 2012), available at http://www.moodys.com/ 
researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004. 
 16. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 638. 
 17. See id. at 639. 
 18. See id. at 640; see also Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4. 
 19. Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4. 
 20. Photocopies and faster methods of communications made it difficult to control 
the free rider problem. Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 43, 51 (2004). 
 21. As the quantity and size of the commercial paper market increased in the 
1960s, CRAs began having difficulties keeping up with the amount of securities they 
needed to rate given the limited funds that a subscription would produce. Cantor & 
Packer, supra note 4, at 4. 
 22. Lynch, supra note 3, at 239–40.  The issuer pay model does provide an 
advantage in that CRAs are privy to private company information and are able to issue 
their rating before a bond is issued. See id. at 242–43.  Prior to the 1930s, ratings were 
announced after the bond was issued and could only affect the secondary market for the 
bond. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 643. 
 23. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 652–53. 
 24. See id. at 648–49.  In the span of 20 years, the staff at S&P and Moody’s grew 
from less than 50 to 1,200-1,700. Id. 
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securities at both the Federal and state levels.25  In 1975, the government 
provided the classification of nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization (“NRSRO”) to those CRAs whose ratings could be used for 
regulatory purposes in an effort to differentiate between the upstart 
CRAs and those that met government standards.26  Frank Partnoy, a law 
professor at the University of San Diego and one of the earliest and 
well-known critics of CRAs, described NRSROs as grantors of 
regulatory licenses and “gatekeepers of the bond market” because their 
ratings made compliance with regulations simpler and cheaper for both 
issuers and investors.27  Even without their regulatory role, NRSROs are 
important to an issuer of corporate bonds.  The issuer asks one or more 
NRSROs to rate their bonds, and the rating, which reflects the rate of 
default, correlates with the issuer’s cost of capital.28  A higher assigned 
rating means more liquidity, lower cost of capital, and a wider potential 
investor pool (e.g., mutual funds and insurance companies) for the 
issuer.29 
A. ENRON AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 
In theory, NRSROs are meant to be unbiased experts of companies 
and securities; 30  however, the past decade has brought to light 
significant flaws in both the quality of the ratings and the business 
                                                                                                                                         
The number of outstanding rated bonds expanded from about 5,500 in 1975 to 
approximately 20,000 domestic bond issuers and 1,200 international by 1995. Id. 
 25. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT 
OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WATCHDOGS 104 (Comm. Print 2002) 
[hereinafter WATCHDOGS REPORT] (“[A]t least eight Federal statutes and 47 Federal 
regulations, along with over 100 State laws and regulations, reference NRSRO ratings 
as a benchmark.”). 
 26. SEC CRA REPORT, supra note 15, at 5–6. While the label “NRSRO” was 
created in 1975, it was not until 1997 that the government attempted to officially define 
NRSROs, though it did not act on the proposed rule. Id. Additionally, until 2006, 
NRSRO status would be informally granted in a “no-action” letter. Id. 
 27. Partnoy, supra note 15, at 681–82. A significant part of the NRSRO reform in 
Dodd-Frank was to remove the regulatory reliance on rating. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885 (2010). 
 28. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246. 
 29. See id. at 247. 
 30. WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 52 (stating that the public expects 
CRAs to be “unbiased and accurate assessors of various companies’ financial 
conditions”). 
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model of NRSROs.31  Enron first shocked the investment community in 
2001 with its bankruptcy, and then in 2008, the subprime mortgage 
crisis threatened the entire global economy.32  Center stage in the midst 
of these crises was NRSROs. 
1. Enron 
On December 2, 2001 Enron filed for bankruptcy.33  A mere four 
days earlier, Enron’s ratings by all “big three” CRAs34 were still above 
investment grade.35  Investigations after the fact revealed plenty of early 
signs of impending doom that NRSROs should have noticed.36  The 
warnings started in early October when Enron informed the agencies of 
a $1 billion write-down of after-tax income and a $1.2 billion 
shareholder equity reduction. 37   Further signs included an SEC 
investigation into several partnerships of Enron’s CFO designed to hide 
the company’s losses and debts;38 the $500 million earning restatement 
that Enron issued on November 8th;39 and the $690 million demand 
obligations that S&P downgrades triggered that Enron hid from the 
                                                                                                                                         
 31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-240, CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES: ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MODELS FOR NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter “GAO REPORT 12-240]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. 
L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2003).  Enron was not the only corporation that collapsed in the 
early 2000s; it was closely followed by other companies in deep financial problems. 
Notably, WorldCom caused another round of criticism of CRAs for yet again failing to 
timely lower WorldCom’s rating to reflect its financial troubles and pending 
bankruptcy. See Marie Leone, Bush Signs Rating Agency Reform Act, CFO.COM (Oct. 
2, 2006), www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7991492/c_7989907=TodayInFinance_Inside. 
 34. The “big three” refers to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, which combined to handle 
over 90% of all ratings for almost every class of securities. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
2011 SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF EACH 
NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION (Sept. 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/2011_nrsro_section15e_ 
examinations_summary_report.pdf. 
 35. See Hill, supra note 33, at 1149.  While Enron was above investment grade 
until November 28, 2001, the company was downgraded by all three agencies starting 
from October 25th and teetered a notch above junk most of November. WATCHDOGS 
REPORT, supra note 25, at 85–88. 
 36. See generally SEC CRA Report, supra note 15. 
 37. WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 85. 
 38. Id. at 86. 
 39. Id. at 88. 
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agencies until its quarterly filings on November 19th.40  The agencies 
tried to shift part of the blame on Enron for providing false and 
misleading information;41 however, the investigating Senate Committee 
found that CRAs’ efforts “fell far below the careful efforts one would 
have expected from organizations whose ratings hold so much 
importance.” 42  The Enron credit ratings were solicited, the ratings were 
not maintained solely based on public information, and all three 
agencies had open lines of communications with Enron staff, which the 
issuer pay model allows.43  The main problems were an insufficient 
review of company materials, the lack of diligent investigations into 
emerging problems, a focus on short-term rather than long-term 
creditworthiness, blindly accepting Enron’s officers’ words, a lack of 
inquisitiveness, and the agencies’ lack of accountability.44 
2. Financial Crisis of 2008 
The Enron scandal paled in comparison to the financial crisis of 
2008.45  The catalyst of the debacle was the high-risk mortgage lending 
at the height of the housing bubble where mortgages would be sold off, 
packaged in pools, and underwritten for investors to purchase.46  Since 
these mortgaged-backed securities were sold into the private market and 
not guaranteed by the government, investors demanded ratings for the 
pools, a task which fell to NRSROs.47  At the height of the bubble, the 
ratings provided by NRSROs were greatly overinflated48 and NRSROs’ 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 120. 
 42. Id. at 90. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. at 90–98. 
 45. Neal Lipschutz, Ten Years Later, Enron Pales in Comparison, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 30, 2011, 11:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/11/30/ten-years-later-
enron-pales-in-comparison/. 
 46. See generally PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., POLICY STATEMENT 
ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2008), available at http://media.hoover.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents/PWGPolicyStateMktTurmoilFinal03122008—FINAL.pdf. 
 47. Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the 
Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1121–22 (2009). 
 48. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 6 (2011) [hereinafter WALL STREET AND 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT], available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/ 
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agents would directly advise the issuers on how certain pool attributes 
would affect a rating, prior to actually establishing a rating.49  CRAs 
issued ratings for tens of thousands of United States residential 
mortgaged-back securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs).50  Most of these securities were rated investment grade (many 
AAA), 51  despite being backed by high risk loans. 52   Even when 
homeowners began defaulting on their subprime mortgages in 2006, 
CRAs did not heed these signs and continued issuing investment grade 
ratings.53  Finally, in July of 2007, CRAs began downgrading thousands 
of their ratings for RMBS and CDOs in a very short period of time.54  
Overall, about 90% of RMBS originally rated AAA in 2006 and 2007 
were downgraded to junk status.55  This sudden change forced banks, 
insurance companies, and pension funds, whose regulatory requirements 
obligated them to hold only highly-rated investments, to sell. 56  The 
RMBS and CDO markets froze and collapsed in a matter of months.57 
                                                                                                                                         
doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2. 
 49. Deryn Darcy, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer 
Pays” Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 605, 641. 
 50. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 6.  While 
bonds are debt obligations of the issuer for a given amount which is paid out by the 
issuer, RMBS and CDO are significantly more complex because they are actually a 
securitization of pools of someone else’s debt.  Before an RMBS is formed, an 
originator enters into a mortgage contract. Id. at 649.  The originator then sells a pool of 
these mortgages (or some other income producing assets) to a special purpose vehicle 
(“SPV”), which issues securities in that pool to investors. Id.  The income received 
from the mortgage payments of the RMBSs are divided to provide the principal and 
interest payments of the RMBS. Id.  CDOs are formed in a manner similar to RMBSs, 
but the securities (and the payouts) are two-tiered. Id.  When rating an RMBS or a 
CDO, NRSRO must look at all the underlying debt obligations in the pool to estimate 
the chance of default. 
 51. See supra note 15 for an explanation of rating categories. 
 52. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 6. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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B. LESSONS FROM OUR PAST 
The last decade has shredded the image of CRAs as unbiased 
specialists there to help investors.58  Instead, as a managing director of 
Moody’s admitted, “[c]ombined, these errors make us look either 
incompetent at credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil for 
revenue, or a little bit of both.” 59   While the outcome might not 
necessarily point to incompetence, the critics, the Senatorial 
Subcommittee, and SEC all found glaring errors in the running of 
CRAs.60  The most severe criticisms have been the lack of regulation, 
conflicts of interest that led to inflated ratings and regulatory arbitrage, 
and rate shopping.61 
1. Lack of Regulation 
The initial problem affecting CRA performance was that there was 
no regulatory system for CRAs.62  Until 1997, there was no official 
definition for NRSROs even though the term has been used since 
1975.63  It was only in 2006 that a formal system was established for 
granting a company the status of NRSRO,64  even though there were 
more than 100 laws that used NRSRO ratings as a benchmark at the 
time.65  It was not until after the Enron debacle that the government 
started considering regulating NRSROs, though the question of to what 
extent still lacks an answer.66 
                                                                                                                                         
 58. See generally WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 115–25. 
 59. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 245. 
 60. See generally id. at 243–317. 
 61. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 89–95; WALL STREET AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 245–46. 
 62. See infra Part II.A. 
 63. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006)); see also infra Part II.A. 
 65. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 104.  
 66. While both the CRARA and the Dodd-Frank Act provided the SEC with 
certain powers to regulate the registration of NRSROs, neither act gave the SEC the 
ability to regulate content of a rating since that would infringe on CRAs’ First 
Amendment rights. See infra Part II.A. 
2013] UNSOLICITED RATINGS & CRAs 461 
2. Conflict of Interest 
Another large problem contributing to the downfall of Enron and 
the Financial Crisis was the number of complications born of the issuer 
pay model.67  There is a glaring conflict of interest when the entity being 
rated pays the rating institution.68  Both the SEC and the Senate reports 
highlighted the increased chance of inflated ratings.69  Since a higher 
rating could allow an issuer to have a lower cost of capital and a wider 
investment pool, 70  the issuer is interested in obtaining the highest 
possible rating.71  The issuer is also interested in maintaining the highest 
rating to avoid a decline in its liquidity and the triggering of rating-based 
clauses in their contracts.72  CRAs, as private for-profit companies, need 
to satisfy their customers, but that obligation conflicts with their primary 
purpose of providing information about bonds and issuers to investors.73  
Additionally, there are regulatory advantages that an investment grade 
rating can secure.74  A rating could reduce the administrative and legal 
costs in filing an S-3 rather an S-1 with the SEC75 or open the security to 
a pool of large institutional investors like money market mutual funds, 
pension funds, and insurance companies who are restricted by 
regulations in the type of securities they may hold.76 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 41; WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 243. 
 68. See generally Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit 
Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 253 (2010) (explaining additional 
conflicts of interest on the agent level where the actual employee has a conflict of 
interest or the agency has an additional interest in having the issuer purchase ancillary 
services). 
 69. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 243. 
 70. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 71. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 273. 
 72. Id.  For the perfect example of ratings affecting private contracts and securities 
post-issuance, consider how the S&P downgrade of Enron triggered a clause in Enron’s 
contracts resulting in a $690 million payout to the investor. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, 
supra note 25, at 88. 
 73. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246–47. 
 74. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 90 
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006). 
 75. See Partnoy, supra note 15, at 691–92; but see 76 Fed. Reg.  46603 (Aug. 3, 
2011) (amending the rules through Dodd-Frank). 
 76. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246. 
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3. Rate Shopping 
Congress and the SEC are also worried about rating shopping by 
issuers.77  Under the current system, the issuer approaches several CRAs 
to receive a preliminary rating, and ultimately chooses which to pay to 
issue the official rating. 78   Even though the rating industry is an 
oligopoly, 79  issuers are able to choose from whom to solicit ratings, and 
would logically choose the agency that gives the highest rating. That 
places external pressure on CRAs to provide a higher rating than 
warranted.80  This was especially worrisome during the financial crisis 
because a select few arrangers underwrote very large quantities of CDOs 
and RMBSs.81  As such, losing these large investors as clients could 
significantly affect profits at the CRAs.82 
Issuers are more likely to select NRSROs that have provided 
favorable ratings for their securities in the past, and therefore may be 
more likely to inflate their ratings in the future.83  The relationship is 
stronger with the more complex and longer maturity bonds because that 
is where the rating discrepancy among CRAs is greatest.84  Issuers with 
short-term debt who are on the verge of the regulatory minimums85 are 
more likely to shop around and solicit just one qualified rating.86  This 
                                                                                                                                         
 77. See WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 244; 
see also Bai, supra note 68, at 263. 
 78. See Bai, supra note 68, at 263. 
 79. See Darcy, supra note 49, at 641 (“Moody’s reported that its market share [for 
structured finance products] declined from 75% to 25% when it increased its rating 
standards.”). 
 80. See id. at 641–42. 
 81. Darcy, supra note 49, at 639–40.  Rate shopping does not just apply to complex 
structured products.  Recent research has found strong indications that rate shopping is 
also prevalent in the corporate bond market. See generally Mathias Kronlund, Best 
Face Forward: Does Ratings Shopping Distort Observed Bond Ratings? (Univ. of 
Chicago, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/events/ 
capitalMarket/CMW15M_Kronlund_BestFaceForward.pdf. 
 82. Darcy, supra note 49, at 639–40 
 83. See id. at 34. 
 84. See id. 
 85. “Regulatory minimum” refers to the Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940, which limits securities that a mutual fund may hold to those that have a certain 
rating. Id. at 4 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2012)). 
 86. See id. at 22. Kronlund focused on Rule 2a-7, under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, which states that if more than one rating is obtained, then the second 
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strategy of shopping around could have two effects: the inflated ratings 
could be used to fool investors and to commit regulatory arbitrage.87 
The traditional defense to the conflict of interest and rate shopping 
problems tainting the issuer pay model was the reputational capital 
model.88  Regulators and investors value credit ratings because they are 
supposed to be unbiased third-party evaluations meant to bridge the 
informational asymmetry between the issuers and investors.89  CRAs’ 
continued success depends on their reputations: if the investors do not 
trust the accuracy of their ratings, that agency’s ratings would be 
devalued and unsolicited.90  The reputational theory provides the basis 
for the notion that the markets and CRAs will regulate their honesty and 
accuracy themselves.91 In a pre-CRARA study, Federal Reserve staff 
found that reputational theory can effectively control conflicts of interest 
in the bond market.92  One of the significant motives of CRAs when 
issuing a rating is to maintain their reputation.93  An advisor is only as 
good as his advice and CRAs are exposed to reputational worries;94 
however, both Enron and the 2008 Financial Crisis provide enough 
ammunition to question whether reputational constraints alone are 
enough to curb NRSROs’ conflicts.95 
 
                                                                                                                                         
highest rating is considered for the purposes of the rule. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 
(2012)). 
 87. See id. at 27.  Kronlund found that investors are cognizant of rate shopping and 
try to compensate through higher yields but was unable to conclude whether or not they 
are perfectly able to adjust for the bias. Id. 
 88. John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: 
The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 127. 
 89. See id. at 158–59. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id.; Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating 
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26 (“Rating agencies are already motivated to 
provide accurate and efficient ratings because their profitability is directly tied to 
reputation.”). 
 92. Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond Rating 
Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives Dominate 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 68, 2003), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf. 
 93. Lynch, supra note 3, at 252. 
 94. Schwarcz, supra note 91, at 14. 
 95. See Dennis, supra note 47; Lynch, supra note 3. 
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II. THE ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS AND THE OMISSION  
OF UNSOLICITED RATINGS 
 
Following Enron and the Financial Crisis of 2008, Congress turned 
its attention to the unregulated business of CRAs.96   The failure to 
accurately rate and timely modify ratings contributed to trillion dollar 
losses. 97   In response, Congress passed CRARA and Dodd-Frank; 98 
however, neither of these pieces of legislation included unsolicited 
ratings because the utility of such ratings was uncertain.99  One recent 
proposal by Fulghieri recognizes that unsolicited ratings will only be 
accurate—and therefore beneficial to the market—when certain factors 
hold true in the Inequality.100 
A. CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT OF 2006 AND THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM ACT OF 2010 
CRARA regulates the CRAs and provides the SEC with oversight 
powers;101 however, before CRARA was even fully in effect, the United 
States was in another crisis—the Financial Crisis of 2008.102  Dodd-
Frank was meant to fix the additional defects in NRSROs highlighted by 
the Financial Crisis.103  
1. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 
Although CRAs advocated for continued reliance on the 
reputational theory and no regulation, 104  Congress disagreed and 
CRARA added Section 15E to the Exchange Act of 1934.105  It was the 
                                                                                                                                         
 96. WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 123. 
 97. See Hill, supra note 33, at 1149; see also WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 6. 
 98. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955 (2010). 
 99. Partnoy, supra note 74, at 71. 
 100. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10. 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006). 
 102. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 103. Murdock, supra note 3, at 1305–06. 
 104.  WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 123. 
 105. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, sec. 4, §15E, 120 Stat. 
1327, 1329 (2006) (codified as amended at15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)).  
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first major piece of legislation that gave the SEC oversight power of 
NRSROs. 106   The Credit Reform Act set out the qualifications and 
registration procedure for NRSROs. 107   In the application for 
registration, the applicant CRA is required to reveal a wealth of 
information about its performance and processes.108  The CRA has to 
provide data on their credit rating performance measurements over the 
short-term (one year), mid-term (three year), and long-term (ten year) 
periods.109  Additionally, potential NRSROs are required to detail the 
procedures and methodologies used in determining credit ratings.110  An 
applicant also has to reveal any conflict of interest it faces relating to the 
issuance of credit ratings so that the public is informed of any inherent 
problems in the rating process.111  After registration, each NRSRO must 
annually file with the SEC the same form with updated data, and certify 
its accuracy.112  In July 2007, the SEC promulgated the rules that would 
govern NRSROs.113 
                                                                                                                                         
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006).  The Act gives the SEC the authority to regulate 
NRSRO registration, organization, and procedure.  However, the SEC is still not 
authorized to “regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and 
methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
determines credit ratings.” Id. § 78o-7(c)(2). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B) . 
 109. Performance is measured by how the assigned grade (and the risk of default) 
matches to the actual defaults in the grade.  The SEC has implemented the performance 
disclosure through Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO. See Application for Registration as a 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (Form NRSRO), available at 
www.sec.gov/about/forms/formnrsro.pdf.  For each class of credit rating, NRSRO must 
provide statistical performance in terms of default and transition rates. Id. But see Lynn 
Bai, The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective 
Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 47, 60, 81 (2010) (disagreeing that 
default and transition rates are adequate, choosing instead to look at fallen angel ratios 
(securities that began as investment grade but in the period, fell to junk or defaulted), 
rating change ratios, and large rating change ratios, which can reveal unstable or 
inadequate ratings). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B). 
 111. Id. In addition to requiring disclosures, the Credit Reform Act gave the SEC 
the power to regulate the procedures that NRSROs were required to enact to control 
conflict of interest problems, which the SEC did by prescribing a requirement for 
establishing NRSRO policies and compliance officers. See id. § 78o-7(h); see also Bai, 
supra note 109, at 47. 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a). 
 113. Bai, supra note 109, at 48. 
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2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 
The Dodd-Frank Act aimed to address the many problems of the 
Financial Crisis, and Title IX specifically focused on NRSROs. 114  
Among the many changes instituted by Dodd-Frank was the purging of 
the use of the credit ratings from all federal laws,115 and a requirement 
that NRSROs develop internal control structures. 116   While the 
aforementioned changes are significant, the most relevant features of 
Dodd-Frank were the Franken-Wicker Proposal (the 15E(w) 
Amendment),117 which has yet to be adopted, and the new disclosure 
requirements, 118  which were expanded to create transparency in the 
rating process.119  Dodd-Frank and the proposed regulations address two 
types of disclosure: those which must accompany each individual rating 
and general disclosures about the performance of NRSRO itself.120 
a. The Disclosures for Each Rating 
Each new or modified rating on a particular security must be 
accompanied by a disclosure form that is clear, informative, public, 
comparable to other NRSROs, and must include performance 
information over a range of years and a variety of credit ratings.121  To 
combat the problem of opaque models that were identified in the Senate 
Report following the financial crisis,122 NRSROs are required to disclose 
                                                                                                                                         
 114. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955 
(2010). 
 115. Id. § 939, 124 Stat. at 1885. 
 116. Id. § 932(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1873. 
 117. Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 
Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,265, 28,266 (May 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter “Solicitation of Comment”] (proposed 15E(w) Amendment attached); see 
Bai, supra note 109, at 50; Dodd-Frank Act § 939F, 124 Stat. at 1889. 
 118. Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1872 (2010). 
 119. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 932(a)(8), § 15E(q), 124 Stat. at 1878.  The SEC shall 
make rules that require disclosure on each initial rating and any subsequent changes 
“for the purpose of allowing users of credit ratings to evaluate the accuracy of ratings 
and compare the performance of ratings by different nationally recognized statistical 
rating organizations.” Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,435 
(proposed May 18, 2011). 
 122. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 245.  
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methodologies as well as qualitative and quantitative information.123  In 
terms of qualitative information, NRSROs must disclose the following 
with each rating: 1) the main assumptions and principles used in their 
procedures and methodologies; 2) potential limitation and excluded risk 
of the ratings; 3) information on the uncertainty of the rating and any 
limits on the scope or reliability of the available data; 4) to what extent 
third party due diligence services have been used; 5) a description of the 
data about the issuer that was used; 6) an assessment of the quality of 
the information available; and 7) any information relating to a conflict 
of interest. 124   In addition to the extensive qualitative information, 
NRSROs must also provide the following quantitative information: 1) 
the measure of potential volatility of the rating; 2) the historical 
performance of the rating and the probability of default along with the 
expected loss in a default event; and 3) the sensitivity of the rating to the 
assumptions made in the rating process.125 
b. The New Form NRSRO 
In addition to making the reports accompanying individual ratings, 
Dodd-Frank calls for annual certification of the same qualities through 
Form NRSRO.126  Under the Credit Reform Act, Exhibit 1 of Form 
NRSRO requires each agency to provide performance statistics—
specifically transition and default rates—for each class of securities for 
the past one, three, and ten years.127  The SEC has noted that since the 
Form’s instructions do not provide for a specific methodology or limit 
the type of information included, NRSROs used different techniques to 
produce ratings, came up with their own ways of presenting the data, 
and generally varied in the manner of their disclosure.128  In an effort to 
make Exhibit 1 disclosures more uniform and understandable, the SEC 
has proposed a standard matrix for Exhibit 1.129  However, two years 
                                                                                                                                         
 123. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 932(a)(8), § 15E(s), 124 Stat. at 1879. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id.; Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 33,435. 
 127. See Form NRSRO, supra note 109. 
 128. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 33,525. 
 129. Id. Below is a sample matrix that would be included with the proposed 
instructions:  
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after Dodd-Frank and a year after the publication of the proposed rules, 
the SEC still has not adopted a final rule.130 
c. 15E(w) Amendment 
The 15E(w) Amendment was proposed to address conflicts of 
interest and rate shopping for complex structured products.131  Its goal 
was to create the Credit Rating Agency Board (“the Board”), a self-
regulating organization that would assign NRSROs to rate new 
structured products rather than having the issuer pick the agency.132  
Any issuer seeking an initial rating of a structured finance product 
would apply to the Board and the Board would select a NRSRO from a 
pool of qualified agencies to produce the rating.133  To become part of 
this pool of agencies, NRSROs would have to submit an application to 
the Board to be considered a “qualified NRSRO” (“QNRSRO”).134  The 
Board would review each QNRSRO’s performance annually, and future 
                                                                                                                                         
Figure 1 
Corporate Issuers — 10-Year Transition and Default Rates  
(December 31, 2000 through December 31, 2010) 
Credit 
Rating 
Scale 
# Of Ratings 
Outstanding  
as of 12/31/2000 
AAA AA   A BBB  BB   B CCC CC   C Default
Paid 
Off 
Withdrawn 
(other) 
AAA 10 50% 10% 40%
AA 2000 1% 39% 12% 10% 8% 5% 4% 1% 19% 1% 
A 4000 6% 34% 15% 10% 6% 4% 3% 2% 18% 2% 
BBB 3600 2% 9% 28% 15% 10% 6% 5% 1% 4% 17% 3% 
BB 1000 2% 4% 20% 14% 5% 2% 16% 37% 
B 500 1% 3% 6% 20% 20% 15% 15% 15% 5% 
CCC 300 4% 6% 15% 25% 20% 20% 4% 6% 
CC 200 2% 8% 10% 38% 30% 2% 10% 
C 160 2% 8% 10% 67% 1% 12% 
Total 11,770 
 
 130. See SEC Proposed Rules: 2011, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/proposedarchive/proposed2011.shtml (last modified 
Nov. 19, 2012). 
 131. Bai, supra note 109, at 49. 
 132. Id. at 50; see also Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 
76 Fed. Reg. 28,265, 28,279 (May 10, 2011). 
 133. Id. at 28,287–88. 
 134. Solicitation of Comment, 76 Fed. Reg. at 28,287. 
2013] UNSOLICITED RATINGS & CRAs 469 
assignment by the Board would depend on this past performance.135  
Rather than adopting the amendment immediately, Section 939F of 
Dodd-Frank calls for an SEC study and a recommendation on the 
feasibility of the 15E(w) Amendment or some other similar system.136 
Based on the directive of Section 939F, the SEC issued a 
solicitation for comment137 on the 15E(w) amendment, as well as five 
alternatives to the 15E(w) Amendment.138  Of note is the option for the 
maintenance and expansion of Rule 17g-5—the equal access rule.139  
Rule 17g-5, 140  promulgated pursuant to § 17 of the Exchange Act, 
requires that if a hired NRSRO has a conflict of interest141 when rating a 
structured finance product,142 it must make the information available and 
accessible to other non-hired NRSROs on a password protected 
website.143  The rule limits non-hired NRSROs’ access by providing that 
they may not utilize the website more than ten times a year.144  If greater 
admittance is desired, the individual NRSRO must issue and maintain a 
credit rating for at least ten percent of all securities whose information is 
viewed.145  The program’s purpose is to encourage unsolicited ratings.146  
In the above-mentioned solicitation for comment, the SEC inquired if 
                                                                                                                                         
 135. Id. at 28,291. 
 136. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010). 
 137. See generally Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76 
Fed. Reg. 28,265  (May 10, 2011). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 28,275.  Other options include the investor-owned credit rating agency 
model, stand-alone model, the designation model, and the user-pay model. 
 140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b) (2012).   
 141. Id.  Conflicts of interest include: 1) being paid by the issuer, underwriter, or 
obligor for the security that they will issue, underwrite, or be obligors for, 2) being paid 
for additional ancillary services, 3) being paid by persons for subscriptions who will use 
the rating to comply or obtain statutory or regulatory benefits or own investments which 
could be beneficially or adversely affected by credit ratings; 4) having NRSRO 
employees own securities in the issuer or have more than an arms-length relationship 
with issuer, 5) being a broker or dealer who is in the business of underwriting securities 
and is associated with NRSRO. Id. 
 142. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3).  For purposes of the requirement, complex financial 
products include all securities or money market instruments issued by an asset pool or 
as part of an asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities transaction. Id. 
 143. Id. § 240.17g-5. 
 144. Id. § 240.17g-5(a)(3)(ii)(B). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov. 
23, 2009). 
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the existing Rule 17g-5 program, with possible modifications, is an 
adequate model to curb the conflicts of interest.147 
The SEC published the results of their study in December 2012, 
which mainly featured a summary of all the submitted comments.148  
The SEC study did not reach an ultimate decision but rather 
recommended the formation of a roundtable for further study.149  While 
academics supported the adoption of Amendment 15E(w) as the only 
workable solution to the conflict of interest problem, the top three 
NRSROs and the majority of commentators took the position that 
Amendment 15E(w) was unworkable, against public policy, too costly, 
and would decimate the competition among NRSROs.150  Instead, they 
expressed the belief that a modified and enhanced Rule 17g-5 is a viable 
alternative solution because the disclosure that would accompany 
unsolicited ratings and unsolicited comments151 would be sufficient to 
control the conflict of interest.152  As commentators pointed out, if any 
version of the 15E(w) Amendment is accepted, it would mean 
unprecedented government interference into a private industry and an 
assault on the self-regulation and the reputational theory that has guided 
the CRA industry since its inception.153 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. See Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg. 
28,265, 28,276 (May 10, 2011). 
 148. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Report to Congress on Assigned Credit Ratings (Dec. 
24, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/assigned-credit-ratings-
study.pdf (hereinafter “SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study”).  
 149. Id. at 73. 
 150. See id. at 30–52 (reporting that a majority of commentators found that the 
15E(w) Amendment has problems of moral hazard, feasibility, independence, 
accountability, reduction of competition, transparency, and market acceptance).  
 151. Unsolicited comments are opinion letters issued by various NRSROs regarding 
a specific security and the rating that the hired NRSRO provided. See Comment Letter 
from Richard M. Whiting, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, The Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 18 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-16.pdf. Unlike unsolicited ratings, 
comments are less expensive feedback for the non-hired NRSROs since they do not 
necessitate the regulatory compliance and the post rating monitoring that official ratings 
would require. Id. Quite a few of such unsolicited comments have been issued since the 
implementation of Rule 17g-5. Id. 
 152. See SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study, supra  note 148, at  55–56.  
 153. Id. at 33, 36–37.  As a comparison, the greatest blame from the Enron scandal 
fell on the public accounting firms. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 
235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). The accounting firms, blamed for the Enron 
scandal, also faced conflicts of interest on both the individual employee level (through 
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B. THE ROLE OF UNSOLICITED RATINGS IN THE NEW REFORM SCHEME 
While NRSROs were brought into the regulatory fold in 2006, 
there was little mention of unsolicited ratings since they slowly faded 
from practice in the late 1990s.  At the turn of the century, there was 
confusion as to whether unsolicited ratings were tools of blackmail or a 
market check, since it was possible to abuse the unsolicited rating 
process.  In analyzing these dual motives for unsolicited ratings, 
Fulghieri and his colleagues recognized that in the state of the 
Inequality, unsolicited ratings would have a positive impact. 
The regulation of NRSROs includes some SEC staples such as 
registration and disclosure, as well as some radically new proposals, but 
neither the Credit Reform Act nor the Dodd-Frank Act addresses the 
issue of unsolicited ratings. 154   The subscriber pay model was the 
standard in the credit rating industry from their inception until the 
1970s,155 and even in the 1990s, after switching to an issuer pay model, 
both Moody’s and S&P rated all SEC-registered domestic securities 
regardless of solicitation.156  However, after Jefferson County School 
District sued Moody’s over the unsolicited rating of its bonds in the late 
1990s, 157 claiming that the rating was retaliation for not hiring Moody’s 
to rate their security, the practice acquired a negative reputation.  The 
issue of unsolicited ratings sparked an investigation by the Justice 
Department158  and the New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer.159  
                                                                                                                                         
lateral positions) and the company wide strata (through the purchase of ancillary 
services). Id. at 684.  Yet, even after Enron, reporting companies still choose their own 
accounting firms even though the accounting sector is strictly regulated and overseen 
by the SEC and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702, 116 Stat. 745, 797 (2002). 
 154. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 
(2006); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. IX, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822–1955 
(2010). 
 155. See Cantor & Packer, supra note 4, at 4. 
 156. Id. at 5.  S&P limited their policy to only domestic SEC registered securities 
while Moody’s would also issue unsolicited rating to both structured products and 
foreign bonds. Id. 
 157. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 
856 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 158. Report: Justice Department Investigating Moody’s Credit Agency, AP NEWS 
ARCHIVE (Mar. 27, 1996, 8:33 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/Report-
Justice-Department-Investigating-Moody-s-Credit-Agency/id-cd839aaea5098 c72f7707 
3dabd8cc702. 
 159. Eric Dash & Jenny Anderson, Attorney General Investigates Moody’s Credit 
Rating Policies, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
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Although both investigations did not lead to charges,160 Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch161 abandoned mandatory policies of providing ratings for all 
securities.162 
Does that mean that unsolicited ratings are illegal tools in the hands 
of NRSROs?  The SEC did not necessarily think so as demonstrated by 
its attempt to encourage unsolicited ratings for structured financial 
products in Rule 17g-5.163  Rule 17g-5 makes the issuance of unsolicited 
ratings for financial products possible and easier, and the SEC 
envisioned that they would act as a check on rate shopping by 
disseminating a true—or lower—rating that frustrates the very reason 
for shopping around.164  The ability of non-hired NRSROs to view the 
underlying data necessary to produce a rating would also produce more 
accurate ratings because under the new Rules 17g-5 and 17g-2, both 
investors and NRSROs have a greater insight into the methodologies of 
and any mistakes made by the hired NRSRO.165  According to the new 
rules, unsolicited ratings would alleviate rate shopping, increase 
                                                                                                                                         
fullpage.html?res=9401E1DB113FF933A05754C0A9639C8B63. 
 160. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Justice Dept. Inquiry on Moody’s Is Over, With No 
Charges Filed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/ 
03/13/business/justice-dept-inquiry-on-moody-s-is-over-with-no-charges-filed.html. 
 161. Fitch, which never adhered to a mandatory policy, uses the term “shadow 
rating” to refer to its unsolicited ratings that are based on largely public information. 
See Winnie P. H. Poon & Michael Firth, Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Lower? 
International Evidence From Bank Ratings, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1741, 1743–44 
(2005). 
 162. Moody’s current policy states: “MIS’s publication of an unsolicited Credit 
Rating will be based, among other factors, on MIS’s assessment of the usefulness of the 
rating to the capital markets, and our determination that sufficient information is 
available to allow MIS to assign and maintain the rating.” Policy for Designating 
Unsolicited Credit Ratings in the European Union, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVS., 1 
(2011), available at www.moodys.com/designating_unsolicited_ratings_in_the_eu.  
S&P does not publish an official policy, but even as late as 2004, S&P did claim that it 
would assign a rating for all public corporate debt over $50 million. Hill, supra note 20, 
at 51. As for Fitch, they issue unsolicited ratings on a case by case basis. Id. 
 163. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 (2012); see Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act 
Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,265, 28,276 (May 10, 2011); Amendments to 
Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act 
Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov. 23, 2009). 
 164. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 63,844. 
 165. Id. 
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accuracy of ratings, and provide competition. 166   However, 
commentators worried that the non-hired NRSROs would use 
unsolicited ratings as a threat by purposely producing a low rating; the 
SEC maintained that such ratings would be beneficial.167 
C. THE INEQUALITY 
A big question remains: are unsolicited ratings a positive tool or a 
bullying technique against creditors?168  The government agencies seem 
divided between investigating the motivations behind unsolicited ratings 
on the one hand,169 and encouraging their use on the other.170  Fulghieri 
recently proposed a new theory.171  Taking into account CRAs’ ability to 
issue unsolicited ratings, their ability to misrepresent the issuer’s credit 
quality through false ratings, and their own reputational concerns, 
Fulghieri explains that a tension under the issuer-pay model exists 
because of the potential for short-term profits by producing an inflated 
rating and the long-term reputational loss that stems from said inflated 
rating. 172   Extending the rationale to unsolicited ratings, providing 
unsolicited and inaccurate ratings—like those alleged in Jefferson 
County School District—acts as a forced incentive to the issuer to obtain 
a solicited rating.173  With this threat, CRAs can charge higher fees for 
the solicited favorable ratings and produce short-term profits. 174  
Economic theorists predict that issuers will pay additional fees up to the 
present value of the costs that an unfavorable bond rating would 
create.175  However, by issuing accurate ratings, CRAs can improve their 
                                                                                                                                         
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Soku Byoun, Information Content of Unsolicited Credit Ratings and Incentives 
of Rating Agencies: A Theory 20 (Baylor University Working Paper, 2011), available at 
www.apjfs.org/conference/2011/cafmFile/12-1.pdf (“Despite controversy surrounding 
unsolicited ratings, there has been little effort to understand the nature of unsolicited 
ratings.”). 
 169. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text for discussion of the DOJ 
investigation. 
 170. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 17g-
5’s encouragement of unsolicited ratings. 
 171. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 3–4. 
 172. See id. at 2–3. 
 173. See id. at 3.  
 174. See id. at 3–4. 
 175. CHRISTOPHER R. THOMAS & S. CHARLES MAURICE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 
(9th ed. 2007), available at http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0073402818/ 
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reputation by demonstrating that they do not create inflated ratings, 
thereby achieving a long-term profit.176  Balancing these two conflicting 
motivations, Fulghieri provides that if short-term profits outweigh long-
term losses, CRAs will have an incentive to use unsolicited ratings as a 
threat against issuers, leading to less stringent rating standards. 177  
Conversely, if short-term profits are smaller than long-term losses, 
CRAs will issue accurate ratings that produce more stringent rating 
standards and improve social welfare. 178   In order to ensure that 
unsolicited ratings are beneficial to the market, short-term gains from 
threatening inaccurate ratings have to be smaller than the long-term 
losses from reputational theory: this is the Inequality.179 
III. USING UNSOLICITED RATINGS FOR GOOD 
In the last few years, Congress has given up on NRSROs self-
regulation and has attempted to generate accuracy of ratings through 
disclosures and the 15E(w) Amendment. 180   NRSROs have become 
integral to the United States financial system, and their inability to 
adequately control conflicts of interest and rate shopping carries steep 
consequences.181  NRSROs provide future predictions for both simple 
bonds and extremely complex products; Professor John Coffee even 
compared the task of rating complex financial products to brain 
                                                                                                                                         
student_view0/chapter3/ (positing that optimization occurs when marginal cost equals 
marginal benefit). 
 176. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id.  Social welfare will be improved by eliminating negative net present 
value (“NPV”) projects by issuers.  Accurate credit ratings, which can better predict 
negative NPV projects by considering the chance of default, therefore increases social 
welfare. Id. 
 179. See id. at 30.  The model provides a framework for analyzing the reforms in 
Dodd-Frank.  In his work, Fulghieri also concludes that there is no downward bias for 
unsolicited ratings because in equilibrium, high-quality issuers acquire favorable 
solicited ratings whereas low-quality issuers would not bother seeking a solicited rating 
and would receive deserving low unsolicited ratings. See supra notes 168–73. The 
unsolicited ratings further reflect the incentive of CRAs to maximize profits through 
threats. See infra Part II.B. Fulghieri’s reasoning, in this respect ignores the motivations 
of the issuers that might produce an inflated solicited rating. 
 180. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 932, 939F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872, 
1889 (2010). 
 181. NRSROs were one of the main causes of the Financial Crisis of 2008. See FIN. 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at xxv. 
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surgery.182  In such an intricate system, it is better for the market and the 
sophisticated players to control themselves rather than trying to impose 
a system such as the 15E(w) Amendment.183 
Unsolicited ratings can be a market mechanism in which the 
NRSROs will check and control each other by issuing accurate ratings 
that will frustrate rate shopping and curb the conflict of interest.184  The 
issuer does not pay CRAs issuing the unsolicited rating, so there are no 
incentives for the CRA to provide a better rating for the issuer in order 
to keep its business.185   Additionally, though the issuer can choose to 
shop around for the most favorable ratings,186 the unfavorable one will 
still be published and so the entire exercise of rate shopping becomes 
futile.187 
This positive result of unsolicited ratings can be achieved if the 
state of the Inequality holds true and the long term reputational costs of 
inaccurate unsolicited ratings outweigh the short-term gains from such 
inaccuracies. 188  Section A will discuss how the Inequality can be 
achieved theoretically.  Section B will consider how the Dodd-Frank 
disclosure requirements contribute to making the Inequality hold true 
and the problems that the 15E(w) Amendment pose to the Inequality.  
Section C will provide additional recommendations to the existing 
regulatory scheme which will promote the Inequality. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE INEQUALITY 
Fulghieri provided the circumstances in which unsolicited ratings 
can lead to more accuracy and higher social welfare: when long-term 
reputational costs are greater than the short-term profits from purposely 
inaccurate ratings.189  The point drawn from the Inequality is not that the 
                                                                                                                                         
 182. John Coffee Jr., Rating Reform: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 1 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 231, 233 (2011). 
 183. For additional support to this argument in the context of complex financial 
products, see SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study, supra note 148, at 56–57.  
 184. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov. 
23, 2009). 
 185. For the discussion of conflicts of interests of solicited rating, see supra Part 
I.B.2. 
 186. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 187. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 63,844. 
 188. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4. 
 189. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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reputational theory is futile, but rather that reputation is one factor to 
consider in the decision making process of NRSROs.190  Ultimately, 
regulators should not abandon reliance on the reputational theory or the 
free market, but manipulate the existing reputational motive to achieve 
the state propounded in the Inequality.  This is especially true in the 
bond market where reputational concerns are stronger.191 
To make the Inequality work, regulators can increase the 
reputational costs and/or seek to depress the short-term profits.192  The 
difficulty with altering reputational costs is that they are both long 
term 193  and hard to measure. 194   To increase the value of one’s 
reputation, a regulator must bring the realization event closer to the 
present and set up a system where accuracy can be better evaluated.  For 
profits from short-term threats, the entire cost comes from the effect that 
a lower unsolicited rating will have on a bond.195  The stronger the 
effect, the higher the cost of the bond will be to the issuer, and the more 
motivation the issuer will have to solicit a rating, even at a higher fee.196  
While it is impossible to control the effect the issuance of the rating will 
have on the market, regulation can target CRA’s motive—the higher 
fee.197 
                                                                                                                                         
 190. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4; Lynch, supra note 3, at 252–53; 
Dennis, supra note 47, at 1132. 
 191. See Covitz & Harrison, supra note 92, at 2, 5. 
 192. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 3-4 (analyzing how the weight of 
short-term profits or threats can affect the Inequality). 
 193. Lynch, supra note 3, at 287–88 (“Secondly, if benefits are to be derived from 
issuing unsolicited ratings, such benefits are likely to be realized only after a prolonged 
period—likely many years, if not a decade—of issuing such ratings.”). 
 194. Id. at 288 (“[P]atterns of accuracy (or inaccuracy) only reveal themselves over 
time, if at all, as enough debtors perform or default on their obligations, and such 
performance can be compared to the earlier ratings issued by a rating agency.  Such 
prolonged periods also give NRSROs, whose ratings might be assessed and perhaps 
called into question by such unsolicited ratings, ample opportunity to seek short-term 
(and, indeed, medium-term) profits by issuing inaccurately high ratings.  NRSROs 
issuing inaccurate ratings are simply unlikely to be ‘caught’ in the short-term.”). 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 173–75. 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 173–75. 
 197. Dennis, supra note 47, at 1133. 
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1. How to Measure Inaccuracy 
In any bond rating situation, one of four scenarios is possible.  The 
NRSRO: 1) provides an accurate rating and the issuer defaults; 2) 
provides an accurate rating and the issuer does not default; 3) provides 
an inaccurate rating and the issuer defaults; 4) provides an inaccurate 
rating but the issuer does not default.198  The only way to measure the 
performance of an NRSRO is by looking at the default of the issuer.199  
If Moody’s rates an issuer “Baa,” the fourth highest rating, it means that 
the issuer’s bond has some speculative characteristics.200  Statistically, 
Baa bonds have a less than six percent default rate in the long term.201  
However, when an issuer defaults on a specific security, it is still 
difficult to draw a conclusion as to the accuracy of the rating (at the time 
it was given) in light of the default.202  
While it is impossible to identify each of the four scenarios, it is 
possible to identify trends.203  Hypothetically, if the default percentage 
on Baa-rated corporate bonds suddenly increased from six to ten 
percent, or the fourth highest rating at other rating agencies only 
produced a two percent default rate (compared to Moody’s six percent 
rate), the apparent conclusion is that Moody’s rating process is 
flawed.204  Prior to the Credit Reform Act, the only way investors could 
obtain performance data was to subscribe to a Moody’s or S&P report of 
their own performance statistics or calculate an appropriate default rate 
for each grade and asset type.205  The Credit Reform Act requires each 
NRSRO to provide an annual certification under Form NRSRO, which 
                                                                                                                                         
 198. Lynch, supra note 3, at 288. 
 199. Id. 
 200. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., RATING SYMBOLS & DEFINITIONS 4 
(2012), available at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx? 
docid=PBC_79004. 
 201. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF FORM NRSRO 
2011, at 71 ex.1 (2012), available at http://www.moodys.com/Pages/reg001002.aspx. 
 202. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 288. 
 203. Bai, supra note 109, at 60, 81 (providing matrices and regressions to evaluate 
performance based on default rates). 
 204. See id. 
 205. Moody’s still provides a monthly default report available to registered users. 
See Default & Ratings Analytics, MOODY’S, http://www.moodys.com/Pages/ 
rr003_0.aspx?bd=4294966834&rd=&ed=&tb=0&po=0&sb=&sd=0 (last visited May 
12, 2012). Similarly, S&P provides annual and periodic default reports. See Default 
Studies, Credit & Economic Trends, STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/gfir/en/us  (last visited May 12, 2012). 
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makes default rates publicly available for observers to monitor 
performance.206  
2. Bringing the Future Closer to the Present 
Just as it takes time for a rating agency’s reputation to improve,207 it 
takes time for a reputation to be ruined.208  For instance, it was not until 
2007 that the inaccuracies in rating CDOs and RMBSs of the “big three” 
NRSROs were revealed; by this time, the NRSROs made billions off of 
the lucrative asset-backed securities.209  When S&P or Moody’s issue an 
inflated rating, the agency is cognizant that the rating underestimates the 
probability of default; however, the statistics on those facts may not be 
available for years.210  At the same time, a CRA that issues an accurate 
unsolicited rating will also not see the fruits of its labor until the relevant 
statistics become available.211 
Until this point in the Note, reputation was discussed as a concept.  
The desired Inequality, however, is based on valuation.212  The question 
for NRSROs is how much reputational loss or gain in the future is worth 
today, which can be approximated using the NPV formula.213  Applying 
this formula to the decision-making process, an unsolicited rater will 
seek to ensure that the amount it spends today to rate a bond will be less 
that the probable future business that will result from the accuracy of its 
rating.214  That future amount must be discounted to the present value, 
and the greater the reputational gain from the accurate rating that 
                                                                                                                                         
 206. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text for all the information that 
must be provided in the initial NRSRO application and annual updates in the 
certification. 
 207. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 288. 
 208. The reputational consequences are the same for both the solicited and 
unsolicited rater. See supra Part II.C. 
 209. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 149. 
 210. In the financial crisis of 2008, the problems did not become apparent until the 
teaser rate on the variable rate mortgages expired. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 
25, at 90–98.  For bonds, the default event can stretch all the way to maturity. 
 211. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 288. 
 212. Only cardinal numbers can produce a mathematical equation or, in this case, an 
inequality. 
 213. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.28(b) (2012). The NPV formula may be expressed as the 
sum of the discounted cash flows Ct/(1+r)t where “r” is the discount rate, “t” is the time, 
and “C” is the net cash flow for the time period (t). Id. 
 214. See id.  
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accrues, the less the present value will be worth.215  A rational CRA will 
not undertake an unsolicited rating if its calculation produces a negative 
NPV.216  The most effective solution is to decrease the time for the 
reputational effects to be recognized.  This can be achieved by making 
NRSROs provide more statistics on their performances, specifically 
statistics covering various time periods.217  For instance, an issuer has a 
particularly strong interest in receiving an investment grade rating for 
borderline investment grade bonds,218 and as such, NRSROs have more 
motivation to inflate the rating into the investment grade category.219  By 
making NRSROs provide information in staggered increments, investors 
can see where solicited NRSROs are inflating ratings and where they are 
more accurate due to the frequency of performance review and the three 
varying time periods used in the evaluations.220 
The Credit Reform Act established a system for shorter reflection 
periods.  Under Form NRSRO, CRAs must provide transition and 
default rates for all outstanding ratings in one, three, and ten year 
increments.221  This system identifies default rates in the long and short 
terms.222  Through this regulation, Congress has taken the first step to 
increasing the cost of reputation by bringing the realization event closer 
to the present.223 
                                                                                                                                         
 215. Assuming the cost of the rating is C0, the payoff in the future from improved 
reputation is Ct, the NPV formula would be NPV= -C0 + Ct/(1+r)t. The longer the time 
period (t), the greater the denominator and the less the future gain will be worth. 
 216. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4. The inverse logic will apply to 
a solicited CRA; it will calculate a present gain from an inflated rating and a future loss 
in reputation and if the calculation yields a positive NPV, CRA should provide an 
inflated rating. 
 217. See Bai, supra note 109, at 51 (noting that new disclosure requirements are 
meant to increase reputational sanctions). 
 218. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 246. 
 219. See id. at 247. 
 220. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1878 (2010) (to 
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)) (requiring disclosure for the purpose of allowing 
more performance comparison between agencies). 
 221. See Form NRSRO, supra note 109. 
 222. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF 
FORM NRSRO 2011, supra note 201, at 71 ex.1; STANDARD & POOR’S RATING 
SERVICES, STANDARD & POOR’S FORM NRSRO: EXHIBIT 1, available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/form-nrsro/en/us. 
 223. See supra notes 227 and 232. 
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3. Lowering the Short-Term Profits 
The short-term gains from inaccurate and threatening unsolicited 
ratings represent the other side of the Inequality equation.224   These 
lower unsolicited ratings can have costly effects for the issuer by 
increasing interest rates for their bonds, 225  foiling regulatory 
compliance,226 or tripping a clause in an investment contract.227  Since 
unsolicited ratings have the power to hurt issuers, issuers may solicit 
ratings to avoid the lower, unsolicited ones.228  This dependence allows 
CRAs, especially the major three, to ask for a higher fee.229  Due to free 
market and free speech protections, regulation cannot affect either the 
issuance of the unsolicited rating or its effect on the market. 230  
Regulation may, however, try to curtail the higher fee motivation.231 
One strategy to prevent the higher fees is to set an industry standard 
for issuer pay compensation.  The standard can be set by a committee of 
representatives comprised of sophisticated investors and CRAs, and the 
rate may be based upon the interest rate borne by that bond—for 
example two basis points of a bond offering.232  This would prevent an 
increase in the price that the unsolicited rating threat might produce.233 
                                                                                                                                         
 224. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 3. For an example, see Jefferson 
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 225. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 175 F.3d at 848. 
 226. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
 227. See WATCHDOGS REPORT, supra note 25, at 88. (discussing Enron’s triggered 
payout). 
 228. See Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006). 
 231. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 252–53. 
 232. SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 13–14. 
 233. Even with a standard price, an inaccurate unsolicited rating may still attract 
more business to CRA as the threat of the rating may entice the issuer to solicit multiple 
ratings. Fulghieri, Strobl & Xia, supra note 10, at 4.  However, a review of the statistics 
makes the effectiveness of this strategy unlikely. In Jefferson County School District, 
the issuer solicited ratings from both S&P and Fitch but alienated Moody’s.  See 
Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848,856 
(10th Cir. 1999).  At the time, the only accredited NRSROs were Moody’s, S&P, and 
Fitch. Bai, supra note 109, at 50.  Currently, there are nine NRSROs, and Fitch has 
gained a larger percentage of the market share.  Yet, even with the expanded number of 
NRSROs, 47.3 % of issuers still solicit ratings from only two agencies and only 28.9% 
of issuers solicit ratings from all three. Kronlund, supra note 81, at 32. It is uncertain 
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While the concept of setting a standard price for solicited ratings 
might be effective in curbing short-term profits from threats, it is a 
significant infringement into the free market system and private industry 
of credit ratings.234  Setting a standard price would require the creation 
of a board with regulatory power over NRSROs, and would restrict each 
NRSRO’s ability to adjust its fee based on the complexity and size of 
the offering.235   The SEC has always favored disclosure over direct 
influence into the free market, so this particular step should be 
considered with caution.236  Currently no regulatory system or proposals 
exist to set the standard price for issuing ratings.237 
B. HOW DODD-FRANK AFFECTS THE INEQUALITY 
In Part A, there were three steps proposed to achieve a state where 
the value of reputation is greater than the profits from threatening an 
issuer: 1) establishing a system that better measures inaccurate ratings; 
2) bringing the reputational realization event closer to the present; and 
3) as a last resort, establishing a system of fixed prices for rating.238  The 
issue is how Dodd-Frank, whose provisions are still just going into 
effect, will contribute to the theoretical model.239  The two significant 
changes in Dodd-Frank are the disclosure requirements and the 15E(w) 
Amendment.240 
                                                                                                                                         
whether or not the issuance of additional unsolicited ratings will lead to an increase in 
the total number of solicited NRSROs. 
 234. See SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 13 n.38. 
 235. See id. 
 236. Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s 
Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 524 (2007) 
(“There is the recurrent theme throughout the federal securities laws of disclosure, 
again disclosure, and still more disclosure.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 237. The 1997 proposed rule that that suggested such a practice was never 
implemented. SEC CRA Report, supra note 15, at 12–14. 
 238. See supra Part III.A. 
 239. While not as popular, unsolicited ratings are still being issued, so the model 
Inequality is the deciding factor every time an NRSRO issues an unsolicited rating and 
even every time, an NRSRO is not ultimately selected by the issuer after doing the 
work, since it then has a choice to issue their already derived rating. 
 240. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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1. Disclosure Requirements 
The recently implemented NRSRO application and annual 
certification required by CRARA should make it possible to spot the 
trends in inaccurate rating, measure performance, and make it easier to 
evaluate the reputation of NRSRO sooner by providing performance 
data through rating transition, as well as default rates in one, three, and 
ten year increments.241  However, Form NRSRO does not proscribe a 
particular technique to calculate the statistics, resulting in each NRSRO 
providing this information in its own way.242  Dodd-Frank tweaked the 
system by requiring that all reports for initial ratings be comparable, and 
the SEC proposes to extend that requirement via a revised Form 
NRSRO. 243 
Another facet of Title IX disclosure changes is the new reports that 
must accompany every new rating issuance or modification.244  This will 
change the rating process drastically and dispel the days of opaque 
models.245  While the new disclosure requirements have not gone into 
effect, the exhaustive description of all the information needed creates 
an impression that size of rating reports will compare to that of an S-1 
filing.246  However, the new disclosures will increase the actual cost of 
an unsolicited rating to NRSROs since the rules apply to all ratings, both 
solicited and unsolicited.247 
In this new report, NRSROs would have to discuss methodologies, 
assumptions, limitations, sources and descriptions of data, volatility of 
ratings, historical performances, expected probabilities and magnitudes 
of a default event, and sensitivity of the rating on assumptions.248  The 
purpose of the new requirements is to help the investor understand how 
the rating was determined, evaluate its accuracy, and compare 
                                                                                                                                         
 241. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,425 
(proposed May 18, 2011). 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. 
 244. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).  
 245. See WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT, supra note 48, at 245 
(discussing the problem of opaque models). 
 246. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 247. Jason W. Parsont, NRSRO Nullification, Why Rating Reform May be in Peril, 
77 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1066 (2012). 
 248. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1879 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78o-7(r)); see also supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
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NRSROs.249  Such disclosures will allow sophisticated investors, like 
institutions, to better gauge the accuracy of a rating, but they will also 
provide an added advantage to CRAs issuing unsolicited ratings.250  As 
competitors, NRSROs will be able to better judge the quality and 
methodologies used for solicited ratings, and the competitor’s criticisms 
can be expressed in the form of an unsolicited rating.251  While this 
motive can only affect the investor post-issuance, it is still an internal 
market check against excesses and rating inflation.252  It will also allow 
for a better evaluation of NRSRO’s performance.253 
2. The 15E(w) Amendment 
In accordance with § 939F of Dodd-Frank, the SEC conducted and 
published a study about reforming NRSROs’ approach to structured 
finance products. 254   At the forefront of the study was the 15E(w) 
Amendment. 255   In their reply to the request for comment, Senators 
Franken and Wickers, the proposers of the Amendment, explained their 
idea in greater depth.256  The result will be a semi-closed market where a 
Board would assign QNRSROs to provide an initial rating; the selection 
process would be based on the job’s size, complexity, and NRSRO’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 249. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932, 124 Stat. at 1878 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78o-7(q)(1)). 
 250. See Bai, supra note 109, at 51 (dual purposes of disclosure). 
 251. For an example, consider Fitch’s public criticisms of S&P and DBRS’ grading 
of triple AAA for $800 million of mortgage-backed securities, where Fitch’s rating 
were not solicited because of its more conservative assumptions. Nicole Bullock, 
Agencies at Odds Over New Ratings, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2012), available at 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66738d12-7f5b-11e1-a06e-00144feab49a.html. 
 252. Consider how the issuance of Egan Jones, a subscriber pay agency, ratings 
actually ended up lowering the S&P ratings for many of the same securities. Xan Xia & 
Gunter Strobl, The Issuer-Pay Rating Model and Rating Inflation: Evidence from 
Corporate Credit Ratings 3 (Feb. 2012) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2002186. 
 253. See Bai, supra note 109, at 51 (the purpose of disclosure is to allow for better 
evaluation). 
 254. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885 (2010); 
SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study supra note 148. 
 255. Solicitation of Comment, Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, 76 Fed. Reg. 
28,265, 28,266 (May 10, 2011). 
 256. Comment Letter from Senators Al Franken & Roger Wicker, to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-629/4629-28.pdf. 
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past accuracy.257  Depending on the version of the Amendment that will 
ultimately get adopted, the fee for such a job may be negotiated by the 
NRSRO or established by the Board.258  The issuer can solicit secondary 
and tertiary ratings after the initial rating.259  According to the Senators, 
this amendment would not affect unsolicited ratings.260  Even if that is 
true, the Senators did not address whether the Amendment would affect 
Rule 17g-5 disclosures.261  It is uncertain if the QNRSROs would still 
have the same conflict of interest, since under the current definition of 
conflicts of interest, it seems that even when assigned, they would 
qualify as issuer paid.262  If there were a conflict of interest, as defined 
by Rule 17g-5, QNRSROs would be obligated to post all the data on a 
website for other NRSROs to view.263  If the 17g-5 disclosures were 
affected, this would prevent, or at least severely compromise, NRSROs’ 
ability to issue unsolicited ratings in the field of structured financial 
products.264 
The 15E(w) Amendment focuses on structured finance products, as 
they represent a major source of rate shopping and conflict of interest.265  
Senators Franken and Wicker, assume that the new system will 
successfully accomplish four goals: (1) reducing the conflict of interest, 
(2) eliminating rate shopping for initial ratings, (3) rewarding accuracy, 
and (4) promoting competition.266  While it seems to resolve the issues at 
the heart of the most recent financial crisis, it offers no solution to the 
Enron scandal, which did not involve structured products.267  It also does 
                                                                                                                                         
 257. Id. at 3–4. 
 258. Id. at 7. 
 259. Id. at 4. 
 260. Id. (“The Franken-Wicker amendment applies only to initial ratings, and does 
not affect non-initial ratings or unsolicited ratings.”).  However, unsolicited ratings 
operate in a free market system and restricting the market will affect NRSRO’s’ 
motives in providing unsolicited ratings – namely the desire to break into new markets 
or industries. 
 261. See generally id. 
 262. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 263. Rule 17g-5 requires disclosure for all situations where the issuer pays for the 
rating and there is no exception for assigned ratings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a) (2012). 
 264. See supra Part II.B (discussing the necessity of requiring disclosure of non-
public information for complex products in order to issue unsolicited ratings). 
 265. Comment Letter from Senators Al Franken & Roger Wicker, supra note 259, at 
5. 
 266. Id. at 3. 
 267. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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not address rate shopping of corporate bond issuers. 268   It simply 
provides a piecemeal solution to a systemic problem that extends to 
every rated security and does so by interfering with the free market.269  
Overall, this amendment creates a scenario that prevents a repeat of the 
2008 problem but does not necessarily set up a system where other 
future rating problems will be prevented.270 
This proposal does eliminate market competition and self-
regulation through unsolicited ratings via Rule 17g-5 and the reputation 
theory. 271   As commentators adamantly stressed, this is an extreme 
step.272  This Note advocates for a scheme where unsolicited ratings are 
accurate and beneficial to the social welfare, in such a way that the SEC 
can encourage its practice without fearing abuse by NRSROs. 273  
Additionally, the narrow application of the reputation theory to improve 
the state of unsolicited ratings demonstrates that it can be workable. 
C. ADDITIONAL USEFUL REGULATIONS 
Both the Credit Reform Act and Dodd-Frank took strident steps 
toward a more transparent credit rating procedure.274  Slight adjustments 
are possible to reach the Inequality and increase the value of an 
NRSRO’s reputation.  Form NRSRO requires disclosure of transition 
and default rates for three periods according to the ratings’ classes.275  
                                                                                                                                         
 268. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 269. See SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study , supra note 148, at 48–51. 
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 271. The 15E(w) Amendment creates a semi-closed market economy. Comment 
Letter from Senators Al Franken & Roger Wicker, supra note 259, at 3–4. 
 272. See SEC Assigned Credit Ratings Study, supra note 148, at 21, 30–52 
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the scope of this Note. For different solutions, see the letters submitted in response to 
the Solicitation of Comment, supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra Section III.B. 
 275. See Form NRSRO, supra note 111. 
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This produces about 75–85 pages of matrices that a typical investor 
would probably not read.276  Ineffective disclosures serve no purpose, 
and buried disclosures are no disclosures at all.  NRSROs need to 
provide information that is simple to understand and is not buried under 
eighty pages of statistics.277  The SEC adopted rules to make disclosures 
in an S-1 application effective, so it is reasonable to require the same 
thing for NRSRO reports, namely through a summary of important 
information in the beginning.278  The SEC has already recognized the 
need for standard, easy-to-follow matrices and has proposed changes to 
that effect. 279   However, the SEC still has not finalized rules or 
implemented those changes.280 
The second alteration would be to highlight the risks and problems 
in the beginning of Exhibit 1 of Form NRSRO to inform an investor of 
the possible deficiencies.  In a S-1, the issuer is required to list the risk 
factors right after the summary section.281  NRSROs should be required 
to do the same with their performance statistics and describe any 
problems or anomalies with the data. 282   For example, part of the 
summary disclosure section can include the following hypothetical 
statement: “The default rates for asset back securities for the terms of 
one, three, and ten years have been higher than predicted by their 
ratings.  The elevation can be traced back to the 2008 Financial 
Crisis.”283  These disclosures will draw the investor’s attention to any 
                                                                                                                                         
 276. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF FORM NRSRO 
2011, supra note 201, at 71 ex.1; STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, STANDARD & 
POOR’S FORM NRSRO: EXHIBIT 1, supra note 222. 
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Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, 76 
Fed. Reg. 33,420, 33,435 (proposed May 18, 2011). 
 278. See Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), 
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matrix. 
 280. SEC Proposed Rules: 2011, supra note 130. 
 281. Form S-1, supra note 278. 
 282. The SEC requires that S-1 disclosures provide a “discussion of the most 
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) 
(2012). 
 283. Though provided hypothetically, the data from S&P and Moody’s does confirm 
the statement. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., ANNUAL CERTIFICATION OF FORM 
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significant inaccuracies. 284   The annual certifications should provide 
information specifically addressing the performance of unsolicited 
ratings, which would both differentiate solicited from unsolicited 
ratings, as well as make it easier to spot any misuses of unsolicited 
ratings.  Given the abundance of the charts already included in Exhibit 
1, the additional cost of compliance for inserting tables addressing 
unsolicited ratings should not be prohibitively high.  Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the additional information would not just be beneficial for a 
better assessment of an NRSRO’s reputation; it would also encourage 
unsolicited ratings of structured financial products, a critical purpose of 
Rule 17g-5.285  The addition of the unsolicited ratings matrices would 
provide investors with the necessary performance and efficiency data to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the equal access rule.286 
CONCLUSION 
Fulghieri and his colleagues address the confusion surrounding 
unsolicited ratings by forming the Inequality, which analyzes 
reputational effects and other profit making motives.287  The short-term 
gains of threats to the issuer are balanced against the long-term 
reputational costs of the rating agency.  As long as the long-term 
reputational costs are higher than the short-term gains, CRAs will issue 
accurate ratings, which in turn benefits society.288  The benefits to the 
market can also be increased by making CRAs more transparent and by 
bringing the costs closer to the present.289  First, the more transparent the 
process, the easier it is for an investor to judge their accuracy and 
reputation.290  It would also be possible for other CRAs to use the in-
depth information to act as a check on the solicited rating,291 something 
which would encourage and enable competition and self-regulation 
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security risky. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2012). 
 285. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61,050, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,832, 63,844 (Nov. 
23, 2009). 
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within the industry.292  Conveniently, the Credit Reform Act grants the 
SEC the power to regulate the required disclosure of methodologies.293  
The other approach to highlighting a CRA’s reputation is to make the 
reputation effects more tangible in the foreseeable future.  Since in the 
Inequality, the reputational effects are long-term, their long-term 
costs/gains have to be discounted to present value.294  If the realization 
of the reputation cost is sooner rather than later, the discounting for the 
firm would be less and the reputational worth would be higher.  
Alternatively, regulators can attempt to decrease the short-term profits 
from misuse of unsolicited rating by a standard industry wide fee 
system, thereby focusing on the increased fee motivation.295 
Dodd-Frank disclosure reforms greatly further the road to accurate 
unsolicited ratings296 by making NRSROs provide extensive reports of 
their methodologies, assumptions, due diligence, and data for every 
rating.297  This would allow investors and other NRSROs to better judge 
the accuracy of a particular rating, and make it easier to provide and 
justify an unsolicited rating for the same security. 298   By providing 
unsolicited rating, competing NRSROs can both increase their 
reputation by producing better models, as well as criticize the models 
and core assumptions of the solicited NRSRO. 299   Ultimately, this 
competition will benefit both the agencies and the investors by 
providing more accurate ratings overall and increasing the name and 
goodwill of previously small or unknown CRAs.300 
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